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Charter schools are under increasing attack for denying
admission to disabled students. But traditional schools also turn
away disabled students, often preventing them from attending schools
in their neighborhood or within their district. This Article discusses
when a school is permitted under federal disability law to deny
admission to a disabled student. After nearly four decades of special
education jurisprudence and regulatory guidance, the circumstances
under which a student with a disability may be denied admission to a
particular school are still remarkably unclear. This Article first
discusses the "zero-reject" principle underlying the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act and concludes that it does not grant a
right of access to a particular school. The Article next explains the
complicated interplay between Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
and the Americans with Disabilities Act and argues that combined,
these antidiscrimination statutes compel particular schools to create
special education programs to serve disabled students unless it is
unduly burdensome or fundamentally alters the nature of the school.
The Article concludes by surveying the regulatory guidance and case
law regarding what constitutes a fundamental alteration and an
undue burden that may justify denying admission to disabled
students.

I. INTRODUCTION
There are roughly 5,500 charter schools educating over
2,000,000 students in the United States, and those numbers are
expected to grow.1 Debate rages over whether charter schools are

* Fanny Edith Winn Distinguished Professor, Loyola University of New
Orleans College of Law. I would like to thank Eden Heilman for her thorough and
insightful review of an early draft of this article. I am also appreciative of the
valuable feedback I received at the symposium “Examining the IDEA in Theory
and Practice” sponsored by Loyola Law School, Pepperdine Law School and
Southwestern Law School and at the Disability Law Section Rountable at the
Southeast Association of Law Schools. Finally, special thanks go to Anna
Boureiko for her invaluable research assistance and Professor Mark Weber for
acting as a sounding board when this article was in the conception stage.
1

Schools Overview, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCH.,
http://www.publiccharters.org/dashboard/schools/page/overview/year/2012
(last
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superior to traditional public schools,2 but one thing is certain: many
charter schools under-enroll students with disabilities.3 For example,
in New Orleans—the district with the highest percentage of students
attending charter schools—students with disabilities comprise 13%
of the student population in traditional schools but only 9% of the
population in charter schools.4 The enrollment of disabled students
in charter schools in Los Angeles Unified School District—the
district with the largest number of students enrolled in charter
schools—is also “disproportionately low.”5 A similar disparity exists
nationwide. The General Accountability Office found that disabled
visited October 23, 2012); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE EVALUATION OF CHARTER
SCHOOL IMPACTS: FINAL REPORT 1 (June 2010), available at
http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/pubs/20104029/pdf/20104029.pdf (noting that charter
schools are poised for “another period of significant growth . . . .”) [hereinafter
EVALUATION OF CHARTER SCHOOL IMPACTS].
2
See NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCH., MEASURING CHARTER
PERFORMANCE: A REVIEW OF PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT STUDIES
2-6 (6th ed. 2010) (concluding that charter school achievement results are mixed);
EVALUATION OF CHARTER SCHOOL IMPACTS, supra note 1, at 3, 75–77
(summarizing research regarding charter schools’ effect on student achievement).
Compare CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, STANFORD UNIV., MULTIPLE
CHOICE: CHARTER SCHOOL PERFORMANCE IN 16 STATES 50 (June 2009), available
at
http://www.btu.org/sites/default/files/research/credo_standrod_charter_school_perf
ormance_full.pdf (concluding traditional school students outperform cohorts at
charter schools), with JOAN HERMAN ET AL., EVALUATION OF GREEN DOT’S LOCKE
TRANSFORMATION PROJECT: FINDINGS FOR COHORT 1 AND 2 STUDENTS 38 (2012),
available at http://www.cse.ucla.edu/products/reports/R815.pdf (concluding charter
school students outperform cohorts at traditional public schools).
3
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-543, CHARTER
SCHOOLS: ADDITIONAL FEDERAL ATTENTION NEEDED TO HELP PROTECT ACCESS
FOR
STUDENTS
WITH
DISABILITIES
6
(2012),
available
at
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/charterschoice/CharterReportGAO.pdf; Robert A.
Garda, Jr., Culture Clash: Special Education in Charter Schools, 90 N.C. L. REV.
655, 681–85 (2012) (summarizing national and local reports of under-enrollment of
students with disabilities in charter schools).
4
Teaching
in
New
Orleans,
TEACHNOLA,
http://teachnola.ttrack.org/AboutUs/TeachinginNewOrleansBatonRouge.aspx (last
visited Oct. 23, 2012); Larry Abramson, Does New Orleans Welcome Disabled
Students?, NPR (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/11/15/142138523/.
5
OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, PILOT STUDY OF CHARTER SCHOOLS’
COMPLIANCE WITH THE MODIFIED CONSENT DECREE AND THE LAUSD SPECIAL
EDUCATION POLICIES AND PROCEDURES ii, 11–14 (June 5, 2009), available at
http://oimla.com/pdf/20090605/PilotCharterSchool.pdf.
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students represent 8% of the population in charter schools, but 11%
of the population in traditional schools.6 The underrepresentation of
disabled students has brought to light a controversial, and
surprisingly unanswered, question in disability law: whether any
school, charter or traditional, may deny admission to a student based
on her disability. This Article attempts to answer this apparently
simple question, but finds the answer to be quite complicated.
Charter schools are public schools that exist by charter, or
contract, with authorizers such as school districts, state school
boards, or universities.7 Charter schools operate free from many of
the local and state regulations that apply to traditional public
schools.8 But charter schools must comply with the federal laws
governing disabled students—the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
(“Section 504”)9 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA).10 Because charter schools are public, students seeking
admission should enjoy the exact same access rights as disabled
students seeking admission to traditional public schools. But the
laws are complex, overlapping, and often contradictory making their
application difficult in traditional schools and particularly in charter
schools.11

6

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 3, at 6.
There are numerous definitions of “charter schools” because of
significant variations among the states. For general definitions, see 20 U.S.C. §
7221i(1) (2006) (defining charter schools for purposes of eligibility of federal
grants); School Choices for Parents, ED.GOV U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Jan. 14, 2009),
http://www2.ed.gov/parents/schools/choice/definitions.html;
About
Charter
Schools,
NAT’L
ALLIANCE
FOR
PUB.
CHARTER
SCH.,
http://www.publiccharters.org/About-Charter-Schools.aspx; Just the FAQs—
Charter
Schools,
CENTER
FOR
EDUC.
REFORM,
http://www.edreform.com/2012/03/just-the-faqs-charter-schools/ (last visited Nov.
17, 2012).
8
Garda, supra note 3, at 663–66.
9
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).
10
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006). For
discussion of the applicability of the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA to charter
schools in general, see Jay P. Heubert, Schools Without Rules? Charter Schools,
Federal Disability Law, and the Paradoxes of Deregulation, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 301, 303, 315, 343–45 (1997).
11
Sean Cavanaugh & Nirvi Shah, GAO Probes Charters on Serving
Students
with
Disabilities,
EDUC.
WK.
(June
19,
2012),
7
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This Article discusses the legal obligations of charter schools
and traditional public schools to enroll disabled students under the
IDEA, ADA and Section 504. Part II examines access rights under
IDEA and attempts to explain how the zero-reject principle applies in
light of the express provisions permitting schools to deny admission
to disabled students and place them at other schools. Part III explains
how the unqualified duty to provide a free appropriate public
education (FAPE) under Section 504 interacts with the ADA’s undue
burden and fundamental alteration limits on the duty to accommodate
disabled students. It concludes that a school’s ability under Section
504 to provide a FAPE, by placing the student at a different school
and merely maintaining financial and legal responsibility for the
student, is limited by the undue burden and fundamental alteration
standards in the ADA. The Article then examines how the undue
burden and fundamental alteration limits have been applied by courts,
hearing officers, and the Office of Civil Rights in the education
context.
II. ACCESS RIGHTS UNDER IDEA
At the core of IDEA is the “zero-reject” principle—no child
can be denied an education because of his or her disability.12 On its
face, the principle appears to prohibit an individual school from
rejecting a student due to disability. But this is far from the case as
IDEA expressly permits schools and Local Educational Agencies
(LEAs) to deny admission to disabled students so long as the LEA
ensures the student is placed at a school that provides the student a
FAPE.13
IDEA merely provides that a disabled student should be
educated “as close as possible to the child’s home” and “in the school
that he or she would attend if nondisabled.”14 Courts unanimously
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/charterschoice/2012/06/gao_probes_charters_on_s
erving_students_with_disabilities.html (noting that the U.S. Department of
Education is planning on releasing new guidance to charter schools on their
obligations to serve students with disabilities because the old guidance is outdated
and unclear).
12
Timothy W. v. Rochester, N.H., Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 954, 960 (1st Cir.
1989); Thomas v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 918 F.2d 618, 620 (6th Cir. 1990).
13
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (2006).
14
34 C.F.R. § 300.116(b)(3)–(c) (2012).
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agree that this language does not create a right to attend a particular
school.15 LEAs do not have to provide special education and services
at a particular school if placement at another school within the LEA
would provide a FAPE.16 The courts do not delineate a precise
standard to overcome the presumption that a student should be placed
at a school he or she would attend if not disabled, but they
consistently require that the LEA have a fully developed appropriate
program at the non-assigned school.17 This permits districts to
concentrate resources for particular disabilities at a limited number of
regional schools and “cluster” students with the same disabilities at
those schools instead of creating programs at each neighborhood
school.18
In the context of charter schools, this requires a charter school
that is part of an LEA to admit and serve a disabled student “[u]nless
the IEP . . . requires some other arrangement . . . .”19 Once a disabled
student is admitted through the lottery to a charter school that is part
of a LEA, the student’s parents and Individualized Education Plan
(“IEP”) team, not charter school administrators, change the student’s
placement to another school in the LEA equipped to provide the child
a FAPE.20 The LEA, not the individual charter school, maintains
legal and financial responsibility for the student.
This is
commensurate with traditional schools’ ability to deny placement at
the neighborhood school if a regional program within the district is
capable of providing the child with a FAPE.
This analysis apparently does not change if the charter school
is an independent LEA. On the one hand, IDEA requires that
LEAs—not individual schools—make “available” a FAPE to

15

White ex rel. White v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 343 F.3d 373 (5th

Cir. 2003).
16

Schuldt v. Mankato Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 77, 937 F.2d 1357, 1361,
1363 (8th Cir. 1991).
17
See Garda, supra note 3, at 677–79 and cases cited therein.
18
Flour Bluff Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Katherine M. ex rel. Lena T., 91 F.3d
689, 694 (5th Cir. 1996); White, 343 F.3d at 382.
19
34 C.F.R. § 300.116(c) (2012).
20
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(iv), (e) (2006); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.116, .327,
.501(c); OCR Staff Memorandum, 22 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L.
REP. 669, 670 (July 27, 1990); Spielberg v. Henrico Cnty. Pub. Sch., 853 F.2d 256,
259 (4th Cir. 1988).
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students with disabilities21 and that every “public agency must ensure
that a continuum of alternative educational placements is available to
meet the needs of children with disabilities . . . .”22 The “available”
language, combined with IDEA placing the primary locus of
responsibility to provide a FAPE on the LEA, could mean that an
LEA must provide a FAPE and a full continuum of placements
within its schools. In other words, there may not be a right to attend
a particular school, but there may be a right to attend a school in the
LEA or district. But traditional LEAs often place disabled students
outside of the schools they operate. IDEA specifically permits LEAs
to place disabled students at state institutions23 and private schools24
as a means of providing FAPE. LEAs also place students at
traditional schools they do not operate, and this practice is not
questioned by courts.25 The only apparent limitation on the LEA’s
ability to deny admission to one of its schools and provide FAPE
outside the LEA is the general provision discussed above that
students should be educated as close to their home as possible and in
the same school they would attend if they were not disabled.
Based on these provisions alone, an LEA may make
“available” a FAPE and a full continuum of alternative placements
by placing disabled students outside of LEA schools so long as it
maintains financial and legal responsibility for the child’s

21

20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(1), 1413(a)(1) (2006).
34 C.F.R. § 300.115 (2012). “Public agency” includes LEAs and
charter schools. 34 C.F.R. § 300.33 (2012).
23
20 U.S.C. § 1413(g)(1) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.175, .227(a)(iv),
.227(b) (2012).
24
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(B) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.145–.147, .325
(2012).
25
Hudson ex rel. Hudson v. Bloomfield Hills Pub. Sch., 108 F.3d 112,
113 (6th Cir. 1997) (child placed in public school outside of district and court held
that IDEA does not require placement in a neighborhood school, but did not discuss
if district must create program within the district); Oberti ex rel. Oberti v. Bd. of
Educ. of Borough of Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 1204, 1206 (3d. Cir. 1993)
(child contested placement in segregated special education classroom outside
district, but court only addressed segregated placement and not whether district had
to create a placement within the district); Wilson ex rel.Wilson v. Marana Unified
Sch. Dist. No. 6 of Pima Cnty., 735 F.2d 1178, 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 1984) (same).
22
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education.26 The “zero-reject” principle of IDEA does not prohibit
an LEA from rejecting a student from its schools; it merely requires
an LEA to provide an education to the child somewhere.27 Because
charter schools that are LEAs have obligations commensurate with
traditional LEAs,28 independent charter schools may place admitted
students at another school so long as the charter school creates an
IEP—the placement decision is made by the IEP team and the
parents, and the charter school maintains financial and legal
responsibility for the child’s education.29
This apparently unfettered right to deny admission and
provide FAPE at another school or LEA (i.e., “off-site”) is troubling.
Taken to its logical extreme, individual schools and even entire
districts could contract out all special education services off-site to
private schools, state schools, or schools in other LEAs, and deny
admission to all disabled students. While this may not violate the
letter of IDEA, it certainly violates the spirit of the law to grant
disabled students access to public schools that had previously
excluded them.30 It is for this reason that the ability of a particular
school to deny admission to disabled students should be limited by
the nondiscrimination principles of Section 504 and Title II of the
ADA. Every child that is IDEA-eligible is almost certainly eligible
for protections under Section 504 and Title II of the ADA, and is
concurrently subject to those protections.31 As discussed in the next
section, these nondiscrimination protections should limit IDEA’s
26

L.Y. ex rel. J.Y. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 384 F. App’x 58, 61 (3d Cir.
2010), aff’g L.Y. ex rel. J.Y. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., No. 09-4422, 2010 WL
2340176, at *1 (D.N.J. Sep. 15, 2010).
27
See supra notes 12–18 and accompanying text (reiterating the idea that
a child should be educated as close to home as possible but without providing
specifics as to the school the child has a right to attend or whether the child has the
right to attend any particular school of choice).
28
34 C.F.R. § 300.209(c) (2012); Ariz. State Bd. for Charter Sch. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Educ., 464 F.3d 1003, 1009–10 (9th Cir. 2006); Thompson v. Bd. of
Special Sch. Dist., 144 F.3d 574, 578–79 (8th Cir. 1998); Friendship Edison Pub.
Charter Sch. v. Smith, 561 F. Supp. 2d 74, 75–76 (D.D.C. 2008).
29
See supra note 18 and accompanying text; 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(A)
(2006) (LEAs must have in effect an individualized educational program “for each
child with a disability in the agency’s jurisdiction . . . .”).
30
See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2)(B) (2006).
31
Mark C. Weber, A New Look at Section 504 and the ADA in Special
Education Cases, 16 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 1, 8–9 (2010).
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permissive stance towards denying admission to schools, or districts,
and providing a FAPE off-site.
III. ACCESS RIGHTS UNDER SECTION 504 AND TITLE II OF THE ADA
A. Schools Must Provide a FAPE On-Site Unless Doing So is an
Undue Burden or Fundamentally Alters the Educational Program
Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
are non-discrimination statutes and have nearly identical language.
Title II of the ADA provides: “[N]o qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity.”32 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides: “No
otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by
reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in .
. . any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . .
.”33 The only readily apparent difference between the two is that
Title II applies to “public entities,” which includes public schools,34
while the Rehabilitation Act applies to recipients of “Federal
financial assistance,”35 which includes any schools receiving federal
money.36 Indeed, many courts rule that schools’ obligations to
qualified students with disabilities are the same under both statutes,
warranting only a single analysis.37
But the regulations include a key difference with respect to
access rights. The ADA requires public entities to make reasonable
accommodations to avoid discrimination unless they fundamentally
alter the program,38 whereas Section 504 requires schools receiving

32

42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (a) (2006).
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 104.4(a) (2006).
34
42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (2006); 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.102, 35.104 (2006).
35
34 C.F.R. § 104.3(f) (2012).
36
34 C.F.R. § 104.31 (2012).
37
See, e.g., Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 272, 287–88 (5th
Cir. 2005); Doe v. Woodford Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 213 F.3d 921, 925 (6th Cir.
2000); Zukle v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999);
Layton v. Elder, 143 F.3d 469, 487 (8th Cir. 1998).
38
42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006).
33

Fall 2012

Rights of Access to Charter Schools

525

federal funds to provide FAPE to avoid discrimination and does not
include a “fundamental alteration” limitation.39
The general
regulations implementing the ADA provide that covered entities must
“make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures
when . . . necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability,
unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service,
program, or activity.”40 Despite the regulation only mentioning
“fundamental alteration,” courts, hearing officers, and the Office for
Civil Rights (OCR) consistently find that this means either a
fundamental alteration to the essence of the program or an undue
financial or administrative burden.41 Section 504 contains a similar
“reasonable accommodation” standard in its general provision,42
Subpart B covering employment43 and Subpart E covering
postsecondary and vocational education,44 but not in Subpart D
covering elementary and secondary education. Rather, Subpart D
requires schools to provide a FAPE without any limitation.45
There is confusion about whether Subpart D of Section 504
implicitly incorporates a reasonable accommodation/fundamental
alteration limitation into the FAPE standard.
If Title II’s
fundamental alteration “exception” applies to Section 504’s FAPE
requirement, schools would not have to provide a FAPE if the
requisite services fundamentally altered the school. The OCR flatly
rejected this position for three reasons.46
First, it cited to the different requirements in the different

39

34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a) (2012).
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2012).
41
See infra Part III.B.
42
28 C.F.R. § 41.53 (2012).
43
34 C.F.R. § 140.12(a) (2012) (a “reasonable accommodation” is
required unless it “would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program
. . . .”).
44
34 C.F.R. § 104.44 (2012).
45
34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a) (2012).
46
OCR Policy Letter to Zirkel, 20 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC.
L. REP. 134 (OCR 1993) (there is no “limitation of the FAPE guarantee.”); Ripon
Unified Sch. Dist., 46 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 82 (OCR
2006) (holding that the FAPE standard applies to educational services whereas the
reasonable accommodation standard applies to non-educational services such as
extracurricular activities).
40
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subparts of Section 504, as noted above, to conclude that Section
504, as applied to elementary and secondary schools, does not
include a fundamental alteration exception.47 Second, it cited to
language in the ADA stating that Title II cannot be construed to
apply a lesser standard than Section 504.48 Reading a fundamental
alteration limitation into Section 504’s FAPE standard would
constitute such a lesser standard. Finally, it reasoned that Title II
adopts the standards of Section 504 where Title II has not adopted a
different standard, and Title II does not specifically address
discrimination in elementary and secondary education whereas
Section 504 does.49
While this logic is sound, courts, state hearing officers, and
OCR itself often apply a fundamental alteration analysis when
determining what accommodations and services a school must
provide for qualifying disabled students. For example, in D.R. v.
Antelope Valley Union High School District,50 an orthopedically
impaired student was denied her request for use of the elevator.51
Instead of utilizing the Section 504 FAPE standard—i.e. whether the
requested accommodation was necessary to provide a FAPE—the
court held that providing the student an elevator key was not a
fundamental alteration of the school program, and the denial
constituted discrimination under Section 504.52 In Tewksbury Public

47

See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text.
34 C.F.R. § 35.103 (2012).
49
42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (2006); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2012).
50
746 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
51
Id. at 1138.
52
Id. at 1132; see also C.C. ex rel. Ciriacks v. Cypress Sch. Dist., 56
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 295 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (failure to
allow service dog was discrimination because it was not a fundamental alteration to
the autism program); Sullivan v. Vallejo City Unified Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 947,
960 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (applying undue burden and fundamental alteration analysis
to provision of a service dog); St. Louis Dev. Disabilities Treatment Cent. Parents
Ass'n v. Mallory, 591 F. Supp. 1416, 1470 n. 89 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (noting that
undue financial hardship limits what services must be provided under Section 504);
William S. v. Gill, 572 F. Supp. 509, 517 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (mentioning undue
burden in placement decision under Section 504); Turillo v. Tyson, 535 F. Supp.
577, 587 (D.R.I. 1982) (noting that the undue burden and fundamental alteration
analysis applies in placement decision under Section 504).
48
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Schools,53 the child in a hospital school required twenty-four hour
physician coverage, enhanced nursing staff, and changes to the
building.54 Instead of applying a FAPE standard, the hearing officer
held that these changes did not fundamentally alter the program and
failure to provide them was discriminatory in violation of Section
504.55 Even OCR has applied the fundamental alteration limitation
in determining what services must be provided to disabled students.56
The confusion over whether to apply the fundamental
alteration limitation of Title II of the ADA and the non-primary and
secondary education subparts of Section 504 to the FAPE obligation
is the result of courts, hearing officers, and OCR asking the wrong
question. The appropriate question is not whether an accommodation
that creates an undue burden excuses a school or district from
providing a FAPE. Rather, the proper question is whether the school
or district must provide the FAPE on-site.
As noted by OCR and in the Section 504 regulations, a FAPE
must always be provided “regardless of the nature or severity of the
person’s handicap.”57 In other words, a school must always provide
a FAPE even if the necessary accommodations create an undue
burden or fundamental alteration. But the regulations permit entities
to provide a FAPE by referring the child to another school, or another
LEA, for the provision of services.58 Section 504, like IDEA, allows
schools to fulfill their FAPE obligation off-site. It specifically
permits recipients, which includes individual schools as well as
districts, to “place a handicapped person or refer such a person for
aid, benefits, or services other than those that it operates or provides

53

17 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 1221 (Mass. SEA

1991).
54

Id.
Id.; see also Mystic Valley Reg'l Charter Sch., 40 INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 275 (Mass. SEA 2004) (holding that requested
accommodations for peanut allergy did not fundamentally alter the program so
failure to provide them was discrimination); Cascade Sch. Dist., 37 INDIVIDUALS
WITH D ISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 300 (Or. SEA 2002) (holding that requested
accommodations for peanut allergy were unduly burdensome and did not need to
be provided).
56
Santa Clara Unified Sch. Dist., 53 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
EDUC. L. REP. 27 (OCR 2009).
57
34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a) (2012).
58
See id.
55
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as its means” of providing a FAPE.59 The Department of Education
interprets Section 504 and the ADA to mean that “schools that do not
offer the special education programs or facilities that may be required
by a student with a disability may refer that student to another school
or educational institution.”60
This seemingly unlimited right to provide a FAPE off-site
means a school or district could refuse to create special education
programs, contract with others to fulfill their FAPE obligations, and
deny admission to all disabled students. This cannot be the case
because the apparently unfettered right to place students off-site is
necessarily restrained by the equal access principles and commands
underlying Section 504 and the ADA.61 Both statutes require schools
to provide: “the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the . . .
service” which is “equal to that afforded others;” services that are not
“different or separate” and are “as effective as those provided
others;” and “the enjoyment of any right, privilege, advantage, or
opportunity enjoyed by others.”62
The issue, then, is not whether a district or school must
59

34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b)(3) (2012); see also id. §§ 104.33 (c)(2),
104.34(a); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, FREE APPROPRIATE
PUBLIC EDUCATION FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES: REQUIREMENTS UNDER
SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973 (2010), available at
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/edlite-FAPE504.html (noting that a
recipient may place “an individual with disabilities in another school . . . .”)
[hereinafter Requirements Under Section 504].
60
34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b)(3) (2012); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS, STUDENT PLACEMENT IN ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS
AND SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT AND T ITLE II OF THE AMERICANS
WITH
DISABILITIES
ACT
(2010),
available
at
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/placpub.html.
61
See, e.g., Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410 (1979) (holding
that a program needs to be modified to the extent necessary to eliminate
discrimination under Section 504); Rothschild v. Grottenthaler, 907 F.2d 286, 292
(2d Cir. 1990) (same); Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644, 653 n. 6 (2d Cir.
1982) (“[S]ection 504 of the Rehabilitation Act requires some degree of positive
effort to expand the availability of federally funded programs to handicapped
persons otherwise qualified to benefit from them.”); Sullivan v. Vallejo City
Unified Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 947, 958 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (holding that “a
program may not be defined in a way that effectively denies meaningful access to
an otherwise qualified handicapped person.”).
62
34 C.F.R. § 300.104.4(b)(i), (ii), (iv), (vii) (2012); 28 C.F.R. §
35.130(b)(1)(i), (ii), (iv), (vii) (2012).
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always provide a child a FAPE—it must and is never excused
because the accommodations fundamentally alter the school or
district. The real issue is whether the school or district must provide
the FAPE on-site. The fundamental alteration “limitation” is actually
an obligation defining what services must be provided within the
school or district.63 Services that do not fundamentally alter the
program must be provided on-site while only services that
fundamentally alter the school can be provided off-site.
This conclusion finds strong support in case law and an OCR
ruling. In Santa Clara Unified School District,64 the district had a
policy and practice of not providing special education services at the
Milliken Basics Elementary School.65 OCR held that the district
must allow disabled students into the school
unless the student is not qualified to attend the
program, and IEP or Section 504 team determines that
the school is not an appropriate placement for the
student, or the District can show that offering the
services needed by the student would fundamentally
alter the nature of the program at the school or
otherwise constitute undue burden.66
Put simply, OCR held that the undue burden and fundamental
alteration limitations may excuse a school from providing services
63

See 34 C.F.R. § 104.34(a) (2012) (“A recipient shall place a
handicapped person in the regular educational environment operated by the
recipient unless it is demonstrated by the recipient that the education of the person
in the regular environment with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot
be achieved satisfactorily.”) (emphasis added); Wong v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 192 F.3d 807, 817 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[t]he educational institution has a ‘real
obligation . . . to seek suitable means of reasonably accommodating a handicapped
person and to submit a factual record indicating that it conscientiously carried out
this statutory obligation.’”) (quoting Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 932 F.2d
19, 25–26 (1st Cir. 1991)); N.M. Ass’n for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 678
F.2d 847, 855 (10th Cir. 1982) (“modification of existing programs may be
required where the financial burden would not be excessive and the
accommodation would enable handicapped children to realize the benefits of the
State's educational program.”).
64
53 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 27 (OCR 2009).
65
Id.
66
Id.
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on-site.
A similar line of reasoning is employed when Courts hold that
Section 504 does not create a right to attend a particular school. For
example, in Barnett ex rel. Barnett v. Fairfax County School Board,67
a profoundly deaf student required a cued speech program, which
involves interpreter services, speech and language therapy, and
resource teacher assistance.68 The Fourth Circuit denied the student’s
request that the cued speech program be provided at his
neighborhood high school because “[r]equiring the Board to provide
every hearing-impaired student with his interpreter of choice at his
base school, instead of at mainstreamed but centralized locations, in
[its] view would constitute a ‘substantial modification’ of the Board’s
educational programs.”69
In the charter school context, this means that charter schools
must provide disabled students a FAPE on-site unless it would
unduly burden or fundamentally alter the nature of the program. If,
and only if, the provision of a FAPE would overly burden the school,
may it then deny admission to the disabled student and place him or
her somewhere else within the district (in the case of a charter that is
part of an LEA) or in another district (in the case of a charter that is
an LEA).
The decision to place the student at a non-assigned school can
be made only after a thorough evaluation of the student70 and must be
made by a group of people knowledgeable about the student, the
67

927 F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 859 (1991).
Id. at 149.
69
Id. at 155. See also R.K. ex rel. J.K. v. Bd. of Educ., 755 F. Supp. 2d
800, 808–10 (E.D. Ky. 2010) (holding that placing a full-time nurse at the
neighborhood school was a “fundamental” or “substantial” change to its program
because the district already offered adequate services at another nearby school),
vacated, R.K. ex. rel. J.K. v. Bd. of Educ., No. 11–5070, 11–5700, 2012 WL
3525403 (6th Cir. Aug. 16, 2012); Eva N. v. Brock, 741 F. Supp. 626, 632 (E.D.
Ky. 1990) (Kentucky School for the Blind was not obligated to modify its mission
and programs in order to make “reasonable accommodation” to blind student who
was also profoundly mentally retarded and, thus, school's refusal to accept student
did not violate Rehabilitation Act), aff’d, Eva N. v. Brock, No. 90–5911, 90–5914,
1991 WL 164324 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 1991); Pinkerton ex rel. Pinkerton v.
Moye, 509 F. Supp. 107, 114 (W.D. Va. 1981) (creating a self-contained classroom
at the neighborhood school involved “substantial modifications” under Section 504
and did not need to be provided).
70
34 C.F.R. § 104.25(a) (2012).
68
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meaning of the evaluation data, and the placement options.71 Before
rejecting placement at the assigned school, the head of the public
entity must decide that compliance would result in a fundamental
alteration or undue burden, and that decision must be made after
considering all resources available for use in the funding and
operation of the service, program, or activity and must be
accompanied by a written statement of the reasons for reaching that
conclusion.72
An argument can be made that charter schools can never deny
admission to a student and provide FAPE off-site but instead must
create programs to accommodate all students on-site.
The
Department of Education states that the newly assigned school must
be “comparable” to the school where the student was denied
admission.73 Because of the uniqueness of charter schools, it has
been argued, there are no “comparable” placements.74 But each
school is unique for at least its location and student body makeup,
which can often be more important to parents and students than the
curriculum or teaching method. The emphasis on undue burden and
fundamental alteration—rather than program uniqueness—should not
change simply because charter schools are involved.75
71

34 C.F.R. § 104.35(c) (2012).
This requirement is not found in Subpart B of Section 504, which
contains only a FAPE requirement, but it is found in Part 35 interpreting the ADA
in state and local government services. See 35 C.F.R. §§ 35.164 (2012) (regarding
communications), 35.150 (regarding program accessibility).
73
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, APPLYING FEDERAL
CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS TO PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS 17 (2000), available at
http://www2.ed.gov/offices/OCR/archives/pdf/charter.pdf; 34 C.F.R. § 104.34(c)
(2012) (“If a recipient . . . operates a facility that is identifiable as being for
handicapped persons, the recipient shall ensure that the facility and the services and
activities provided therein are comparable to the other facilities, services, and
activities of the recipient.”).
74
See, e.g., Heubert, supra note 10, at 321 n. 98, 332–33, 340; Paul
O’Neill, Richard Wenning & Elizabeth Giovannetti, Serving Students With
Disabilities in Charter Schools: Legal Obligations and Policy Options, 169 ED. L.
REP. 1, 12–13 (2002); Santa Clara Unified Sch. Dist., 53 INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 27 (OCR 2009) (OCR rejected the position that
services do not have to be offered at the particular school because they were
offered at other district schools, because “this general principle is applicable . . .
only with respect to sites that offer the same educational program” and “Millikin is
a unique program.”).
75
See Garda, supra note 3, at 704–05.
72
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At the other extreme, an argument can be made that schools
can always deny admission to a disabled student and merely assume
legal and financial responsibility for providing a FAPE off-site.
Nothing in IDEA or Subpart B of Section 504 expressly limits the
right to place students off-site. If the undue burden limitation cannot
be implied into Subpart B to limit the FAPE requirement, the
argument goes, then a reasonable accommodation requirement
demanding services be provided on-site can also not be implied.
Cost concerns clearly support this position as schools and districts
can accrue significant efficiency savings by clustering students with
similar disabilities at one institution instead of creating programs at
each institution. But this argument misses the mark because the
general equal access and equal opportunity provisions of Section 504
and the ADA are not negated by the off-site FAPE provisions of
Section 504. It is the other way around— the off-site FAPE
provisions should be limited by the anti-discrimination directives. It
is well established that schools and districts cannot have a policy
categorically denying admission to students based on their disability
or need for additional services.76 No school can reject an entire class
of disabled students and refer them to another school, meaning that
the off-site FAPE provisions are circumscribed.77
In sum, charter schools like traditional schools must always
provide disabled students a FAPE irrespective of the burden. They
may deny admission and provide FAPE off-site only if providing the
FAPE on-site would unduly burden or fundamentally alter the nature
of the charter school. The critical issue, then, is what constitutes a
fundamental alteration or undue financial burden.

76

28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (b)(8) (2012); Guthrie Pub. Sch., 5 EARLY
CHILDHOOD LAW & POL’Y REP. 10 (OCR 2006) (holding that “children with
disabilities cannot be categorically excluded from the program and must be offered
meaningful access to the program.”); Raytown C-2 Sch. Dist., 53 INDIVIDUALS
WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 239 (OCR 2009) (same); Santa Clara Unified
Sch. Dist., 53 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 27 (OCR 2009)
(same).
77
Requirements Under Section 504, supra note 59.
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B. Fundamental Alterations and Undue Burdens in Schools
Courts, hearing officers, and the OCR have had many
occasions to determine what constitutes an undue financial burden or
a fundamental alteration to a program, but rarely in the context of
deciding what services must be provided on-site by public primary
and secondary schools.78 The next section focuses on decisions that
discuss the fundamental alteration and undue burden requirements in
the school context.
1. Undue Financial Burden
OCR defines an undue burden as “an action requiring
significant difficulty or expense or one that is unduly costly,
extensive, substantial, or disruptive.”79 The Supreme Court, in the
employment context, has held that the undue hardship inquiry
requires not simply an assessment of the cost of the
accommodation in relation to the recipient’s overall
budget, but a ‘case-by-case analysis weighing factors
that include: (1) the overall size of the recipient’s
program with respect to number of employees,
number and type of facilities, and size of budget; (2)
the type of the recipient’s operation, including the
composition and structure of the recipient’s

78

See, e.g., Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n. 17
(1987) (holding in the employment context that accommodations are not reasonable
if they impose “undue financial and administrative burdens” or if they require a
“fundamental alteration in the nature of a program.”) (citations omitted); Se. Cmty.
Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412 (1979) (holding in the higher education context
that accommodations are not reasonable if they impose undue financial and
administrative burdens); Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999)
(applying fundamental alteration and undue financial burden test in the context of
state mental health system).
79
Glendale Unified Sch. Dist., 4 EARLY CHILDHOOD LAW & POL’Y REP.
101 (OCR 1988). The undue burden standard requires a showing that “the cost of
additional supervision is so great that it would cause the program to collapse
financially or become prohibitively expensive for many of its current participants.”
Id.
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workforce; and (3) the nature and cost of the
accommodations needed.’80
Application of this standard is inconsistent depending on the
educational setting in which it is applied. In academic programs
within public schools, OCR applies a high standard. Of the cases
reviewed, OCR has never excused a school or district from providing
a service because its provision was unduly burdensome.81 The
sample size is small because, as explained above, of the significant
confusion over whether, and how, the undue burden “limitation”
applies to the academic programs in public schools.82 Based on the
small sample, though, it appears that charter schools will have a
difficult time refusing to provide services on-site because of an undue
financial burden.
In the non-academic context, the undue burden hurdle is
slightly less stringent.83 For example, in Timothy H. ex rel. Kratisha
H. v. Cedar Rapids Community School District, the Eighth Circuit
held that spending $24,000 on a special bus route to allow a disabled
child to attend a non-neighborhood school as part of an intra-district
80

Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 608 n. 16 (relying upon 28 C.F.R. § 42.511(c)
(dealing with nondiscrimination in employment context)). See also 28 C.F.R. §
36.104 (2012) (defining “undue burden” in public accommodation context).
81
See Santa Clara Unified Sch. Dist., 53 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
EDUC. L. REP. 27 (OCR 2009) (OCR rejected argument that it would be unduly
burdensome to provide special education services because the district failed to
present any evidence of costs or how or why that cost would unduly burden the
district); Ripon Unified Sch. Dist., 46 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L.
REP. 82 (OCR 2006) (holding that use of behavior intervention strategies, that were
part of child’s IEP, in aftercare program and changing general discipline policies
did not fundamentally alter the program); Mystic Valley Reg’l Charter Sch., 40
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 275 (Mass. SEA 2004) (holding
that in-class ban on peanuts, provision of safe food substitutes, staff training and in
place emergency protocols were not undue burdens to accommodate a child with a
life threatening peanut allergy); Tewskbury Public Sch., 17 INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 1221 (Mass. SEA 1991) (structural modifications and
additional staff were not an undue financial burden to a public hospital school,
despite being costly, in part because the services would have also benefited nine
other students).
82
See supra Part III.A.
83
Bellevue Sch. Dist. No. 405, 4 EARLY CHILDHOOD LAW & POL’Y REP.
136 (OCR 1999) (noting different standards that apply to academic and nonacademic programs and activities).
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transfer program was an undue financial burden.84 And in McDavid
v. Arthur, the court held that the provision of glucagon-trained staff
at all times in after-school and summer programs would “self
evidently” impose an undue financial burden.85 Neither court
discussed the cost of the service compared to the recipient’s overall
budget or any of the factors identified by the Supreme Court in their
analysis. These two cases are rare exceptions to the typical holding
that requested accommodations do not impose undue financial
burdens.86 For example, in Broward County School District, OCR
found that hiring a one-on-one aide was not an undue financial
burden on an aftercare program, despite the program being in the red,
because it considered all the District’s resources for aftercare
programs.87 Numerous cases reach similar conclusions.88
84

178 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999).
437 F. Supp. 2d 425, 429 (D. Md. 2006).
86
See also Cascade Sch. Dist., 37 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC.
L. REP. 300 (Or. SEA 2002) (holding that it was an undue administrative burden to
require a school to prohibit distribution of any food that may contain peanuts when
it came to non-mandatory extracurricular events because it would require district to
police behavior of participants, parents and community members).
87
44 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 66 (OCR 2005).
88
See, e.g., AP ex rel. Peterson v. Anoka-Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. No.
11, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1142 (D. Minn. 2008) (holding that provision of a nurse
trained to administer a blood-glucose meter and insulin pump in a daycare setting
would probably not be an undue financial burden); Raytown C-2 Sch. Dist., 53
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 239 (OCR 2009) (holding that
providing 1:1 aide for autistic child did not unduly burden aftercare program);
Chattahoochee Cnty. Sch. Dist., 6 EARLY CHILDHOOD LAW & POL’Y REP. 26 (OCR
2008) (holding that provision of 1:1 aide for child with cerebral palsy did not
unduly burden after school childcare program because the $48/day cost was small
compared to entire operating budget of program); Guthrie Pub. Sch., 5 EARLY
CHILDHOOD LAW & POL’Y REP. 10 (OCR 2006) (holding that mere fact that
additional personnel would have to be hired in aftercare to accommodate child’s
unpredictable and disruptive behavior program was not an undue burden); Murrieta
Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 44 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 12
(OCR 2005) (holding that training staff to implement a behavior modification plan
would not be an undue burden because costs are minimal); Mentor Exempted Vill.,
32 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 243 (OCR 2000) (provision of
1:1 aide in summer program for severely autistic child was not an undue burden
because cost could be absorbed by all children in the program for a minimal cost);
Cherry Creek Sch. Dist. #5, 3 EARLY CHILDHOOD LAW & POL’Y REP. 184 (OCR
1997) (holding that provision of 1:1 aide in summer program was not an undue
financial burden despite minimal profit margin, no ending balance, and director
85
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The undue burden limitation is most liberally applied in the
“public accommodation” context, such as private schools. For
example, in Hunt v. St. Peter School,89 the court held:
[A] mandatory [scent free environment] policy would
be burdensome, indeed unworkable. St. Peter has an
unusually small administrative staff, one principal and
a part-time secretary for nearly 500 students in eight
grades. It does not have a full-time nurse but relies
upon a public health nurse who comes occasionally . .
. . It would be unreasonable to require the school to
enforce
a
scent-free
policy
under
these
circumstances.90
Courts find accommodations are not unduly burdensome to private
schools only when they are minimal in cost, such as teacher training91
or creating and abiding by a specialized schedule.92
Several lessons for charter schools can be drawn from these
cases. First, charter schools face a high burden in refusing to provide
services on-site and denying disabled students admission on the
was not paid for her work for one year); Conejo Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 23
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 448 (OCR 1995) (holding that
hiring a part time aide at $8-10/hour for an aftercare program was not an undue
financial burden for a program that was able to raise sufficient funds in one year to
pay $80,000 of an outstanding debt).
89
963 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Mo. 1997).
90
Id. at 852. See also Roberts v. KinderCare Learning Ctrs., Inc., 86 F.3d
844, 925–27 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the provision of 1:1 aide was an undue
financial burden because the wages paid the aide were double the revenue the
private daycare earned in tuition from the disabled student); D.R. v. Antelope
Valley Union High Sch. Dist., 746 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
(holding that it was unduly burdensome for a private school to provide a student
with serious disciplinary problems individual therapy because it does not normally
provide such therapy, and apparently is neither equipped nor qualified to do so).
91
Alvarez ex rel. Alvarez v. Fountainhead, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1048,
1054 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (requiring private preschool teachers to undergo training to
recognize symptoms of wheezing and assist in administering an inhaler was not an
undue financial burden because the training was free and the student offered to sign
a liability waiver).
92
Burriola v. Greater Toledo YMCA, 133 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1039 (N.D.
Ohio 2001) (holding that supplies to make a child-specific schedule and time and
effort to make schedule were not undue financial burdens).
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grounds that the cost is unduly burdensome. The stringent
application of the undue burden standard to academic programs
comports with the nondiscrimination principles of access and
opportunity that are comparable to non-disabled students.
Second, the legal status of the charter as an independent LEA
or part of an LEA impacts the undue burden analysis. On the one
hand, charter schools that are part of a LEA will have a harder time
establishing an undue burden than independent charter schools
because the overall budget considered in the analysis is that of the
entire LEA. For independent charter schools, its smaller budget,
resources, and personnel make it easier to establish an undue burden
than a charter school in a district with more resources. On the other
hand, charter schools that are part of a LEA and deny admission in
order to cluster students with particular disabilities at a regional
program within the LEA may be subject to a lower undue burden
standard. Courts employ a more lenient standard—one of resource
allocation efficiency—when holding that students do not have a right
to attend a particular school within a LEA.93 But, no matter the legal
status, the burden of establishing financial hardship is still steep.
2. Fundamental Alteration
A fundamental alteration is one that requires a change in the
essential nature of services being offered.94 In the most recent
Supreme Court case on this issue, the Court held that allowing a
professional golfer to use a cart during PGA tour events did not
fundamentally alter the game of professional golf because “[t]he use
of carts is not inconsistent with the fundamental character of golf, the
essence of which has always been shotmaking.”95 The critical
inquiry, therefore, is determining the essential nature of the school
program.
93

See supra note 63 and accompanying text; Garda, supra note 3, at 677–

79, 705.
94

PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 682 (2001); Glendale Unified
Sch. Dist., 4 EARLY CHILDHOOD LAW & POL’Y REP. 101 (OCR 1988). For a
general discussion of the fundamental alteration defense, see Kerri Lynn Stone, The
Politics of Difference and Inclusion: Toward a Uniform Framework for the
Analysis of “Fundamental Alteration” Under the ADA, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1241
(2007) (summarizing cases applying fundamental alteration defense).
95
Martin, 532 U.S. at 663.
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This analysis was quite simple in Montalvo v. Radcliffe,96
where a child with HIV requested that a private karate academy make
its instructional style less physically combative to ensure no blood
was drawn.97 The Fourth Circuit held that “[t]o require U.S.A.
Bushidokan to make its program a less combat-oriented, interactive,
contact intensive version of karate would constitute a fundamental
alteration of the nature of its program. The ADA does not require
U.S.A Bushidokan to abandon its essential mission and to offer a
fundamentally different program of instruction.”98
But in the public school context, particularly public schools
with a unique curriculum, the analysis becomes more difficult. In
Santa Clara Unified School District,99 the Millikin Basics+
Elementary School denied admission to disabled students requiring a
resource specialist program because the resource specialist program
fundamentally altered the group instructional model utilized at the
school.100 OCR rejected this argument because some students with
disabilities could benefit from group instruction. “The fact that a
student may need some form of special education does not [sic] per
se establish that his or her participation would [sic] require a
fundamental alteration of the program.”101 In addition, OCR noted
that the school already provided pull-out services such as counseling
and English language learning.102 The essence of the school was not
group instruction in all circumstances, and even if it were, some
disabled students could benefit from the methodology, and a
categorical ban was discriminatory.
Similar conclusions are
routinely reached in the academic context; and, of the cases

96

167 F.3d 873 (4th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 875.
98
Id. at 879. See also Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 152
(5th Cir. 1998) (holding that “the normal progressive discipline built into the
school’s code was . . . effectively enjoined from suspending Jason, as it would any
other student, for repeated disruptive behavior. This was an alteration of a
fundamental requirement of the school’s academic program and as such is not
required by the ADA.”).
99
53 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 27 (OCR 2009).
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
97
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reviewed, only one upheld denial of service because it fundamentally
altered the program.103
Even in the non-academic services context, the fundamental
alteration limitation is strictly applied. A fundamental alteration is
typically found only when the student, even with accommodation,
cannot participate in a majority of the program. In Mentor Exempted
Village, the OCR found that provision of a one-on-one aide for an
autistic child in a summer program did not fundamentally alter the
program merely because it changed the staff-child ratio. But the
OCR allowed the summer program to deny admission to the student
because, even with the aide, the child would be unable to participate
in field trips, which accounted for sixty percent of the activities and
would have to be given alternative care.104
A fundamental alteration can also be found when the only
effective accommodation changes the essence of the program. The
OCR permitted the Bellevue School District to exclude a disruptive

103

Timothy H. v. Cedar Rapids Cmty Sch. Dist., 178 F.3d 968, 973 (8th
Cir. 1999) (finding that “requiring the school district to spend any amount of
money to provide transportation to students participating in its intra-district transfer
program would fundamentally alter the main requirement of the program designed
to be of no cost to the school district-parental transportation.”). But see D.R. v.
Antelope Valley Union High Sch. Dist., 746 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1148 (C.D. Cal.
2010) (finding that provision of elevator key did not fundamentally alter nature of
program); C.C. ex rel. Ciriacks v. Cypress Sch. Dist., 56 INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 295 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (holding that caring for service
dog and training teachers several commands for dog did not fundamentally alter
public autism program because program changes would be minor); Tewskbury
Public Sch., 17 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 1221 (Mass. SEA
1991) (holding that “[g]iven the Hospital School’s dual status as a hospital and a
specialized school for [disabled students] the [additional professional services]
sought by Christopher do not require a fundamental alteration in the nature of the
program.”); Mystic Valley Reg’l Charter Sch., 40 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
EDUC. L. REP. 275 (Mass. SEA 2004) (holding that accommodations such as a
classroom peanut ban that impacted other students did not fundamentally alter the
educational program).
104
Mentor Exempted Vill., 32 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L.
REP. 243 (OCR 2000). See also Cherry Creek Sch. Dist. #5, 3 EARLY CHILDHOOD
LAW & POL’Y REP. 184 (OCR 1997) (holding that admitting student with severe
ADHD would fundamentally alter summer program because it would reduce the
adult-child ratio, it would not be able to permit the child to attend most field trips
and excursions which make up most of the program and it would have to provide
an effective setting for the student’s removal from the group at the school).
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and physically dangerous child from an after-school child care
program because the only accommodation to address his behavior
was reducing the number of children in the program and the
“essential nature [of the program] was to provide a safe environment
for a large group of children to engage in supervised, unstructured
activities . . . .”105 The provision of one-on-one aides or additional
supervision is rarely found to be a fundamental alteration of the
program because “the provision of extra supervision and services
does not fundamentally alter the nature of a program designed to
provide supervision for children . . . .”106 In addition, minor
adjustments, such as implementing behavior plans and providing
105

Bellevue Sch. Dist., 4 EARLY CHILDHOOD LAW & POL’Y REP. 136
(OCR 1999). See also McDavid v. Arthur, 437 F. Supp. 2d 425, 429 (D. Md.
2006) (holding, without any analysis, that provision of glucagon trained staff at all
times in after school and summer program would fundamentally alter the nature of
the program).
106
Raytown C-2 Sch. Dist., 53 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L.
REP. 239 (OCR 2009). See also Chattahoochee Cnty. Sch. Dist., 6 EARLY
CHILDHOOD LAW & POL’Y REP. 26 (OCR 2008) (holding that provision of extra
supervision for child with cerebral palsy did not fundamentally alter after school
childcare program); Glendale Unified Sch. Dist., 4 EARLY CHILDHOOD LAW &
POL’Y REP. 101 (OCR 1988) (holding that provision of 1:1 aide in before and after
school program did not fundamentally alter program because “the essence of the
CD Program is to provide supervision to children. What disabled children may
require is more of such supervision [therefore] it does not change the program.”);
Broward County Sch. Dist., 4 EARLY CHILDHOOD LAW & POL’Y REP. 139 (OCR
1999) (holding that provision of 1:1 aide for after-school care did not
fundamentally alter the program); Orr ex rel. Huffstutler v. KinderCare Learning
Ctrs., 23 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 181 (E.D. Cal. 1995)
(holding that personal services needed by child with mental retardation, low vision
and mild seizures did not fundamentally alter private daycare program because
“providing these personal services to children under three years of age is part of
Kindercare’s normal program, plaintiffs have made a strong showing that it is a
reasonable modification, but not a fundamental alteration, for Kindercare to
provide these services to an older child like Jeremy who needs the services, not
because of his age but because of his disability.”); Burriola v. Greater Toledo
YMCA, 133 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1038 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (holding that provision of
one-on-one attention at private group daycare facility and creating schedule for an
autistic child did not fundamentally alter program because even in group daycare
setting teachers are required to provide one-on-one attention to students and an
autistic child in the program already had a 1:1 aide). But see Roberts v.
KinderCare Learning Ctrs., Inc., 86 F.3d 844, 925–26 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that
provision of 1:1 aide fundamentally altered private daycare center services without
any analysis).
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nursing services, are also not fundamental alterations to nonacademic programs.107
Charter schools can draw several lessons from the above
cases. First, no school can categorically exclude all disabled students
or categories of disabled students on the grounds that those students
would change the essential character of the school. Each child must
be looked at individually, and it cannot be assumed that
accommodating any particular disabling condition would require a
fundamental alteration. For example, a charter school that utilizes a
Waldorf or Montessori method which relies primarily on guided free
play and self-directed learning cannot categorically exclude autistic
students simply because those students typically need a highlystructured and directed education. Instead, the school must look at
the unique needs of each individual child to see if he or she could
benefit from a majority of the program with accommodation.
Second, the more unique the curriculum or teaching method, the
more likely a fundamental alteration can be established. It would be
easier for the hypothetical Waldorf or Montessori charter school to
deny admission to an autistic child because he or she could not
participate in the guided free play or self-directed learning than a
charter school utilizing more traditional teaching methods. The more
vanilla the teaching method or curriculum, the less likely there will
be a fundamental alteration.
Even with a unique methodology or curriculum, the burden
will still be high to establish a fundamental alteration. The school
would either need to show that, even with accommodations, the child
could not participate in a majority of the program (i.e. the autistic
107

Murrieta Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 44 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
EDUC. L. REP. 12 (OCR 2005) (holding that training for, and implementation of,
behavior plan was not a fundamental alteration of an after school childcare
program); Mukilteo Sch. Dist. No. 6, 51 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L.
REP. 85 (OCR 2008) (holding that using student aide to open doors and help
mobility impaired students up ramps did not fundamentally alter a summer
vocational school program); Alachua County Sch. Dist., 52 INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 204 (OCR 2009) (holding that providing assistance for
student with colostomy bag did not fundamentally alter after-school enrichment
program); Alvarez ex rel. Alvarez v. Fountainhead, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1052
(N.D. Cal. 1999) (requiring private preschool teachers to recognize symptoms of
wheezing and assist in administering an inhaler was not a fundamental alteration
because “teachers are not being asked to engage in a function that is wholly
different from those duties already being performed for other children”).
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child would be in a resource room for more than half the day in the
Montessori school) or that the only effective accommodation would
change the essence of the program (i.e. the only effective
modification to the Montessori method for the autistic child would be
to eliminate guided free play).
IV. CONCLUSION
The simple conclusion that access rights of disabled students
to charter schools are the same as their access rights to traditional
schools masks several complicating factors. First, the access rights
of disabled students to traditional schools are far from settled. The
statutes, regulations, and jurisprudence do not clearly indicate when a
school must provide a FAPE on-site and when it can fulfill that
responsibility off-site at another school or in another district/LEA.
IDEA is founded on the “zero-reject” principle but expressly allows
schools and districts to provide FAPE outside the district or school.
Section 504 demands equal access, but allows schools and districts to
provide FAPE off-site, apparently without limitation. Title II of the
ADA also provides for equal access, but includes a fundamental
alteration and undue burden limitation—a limitation apparently not
imposed under Section 504. Finally, courts allow schools and
districts to provide FAPE off-site but only in undefined
circumstances. The only way to make sense of these competing
principles and directives is to require schools, both traditional and
charter, to (1) be financially and legally responsible for FAPE under
all circumstances, and (2) provide FAPE on-site unless it can
establish, through proper procedures, that it is unduly burdensome or
fundamentally alters the nature of the program.
The second confusing factor is that some charter schools exist
as part of LEAs whereas others are their own, one-school LEAs.
Section 504 and the ADA, applying to recipients of federal funding
and public entities, respectively, draw no distinction in the
obligations between independent and dependent LEAs. IDEA,
however, places the locus of responsibility on the LEA and not
individual schools, apparently making it more permissive of off-site
placement for charters that are part of LEAs. On the other hand, the
more limited budgets and resources of independent charter schools
means the undue burden hurdle is easier to overcome than for
charters that are part of a larger LEA. It is difficult, if not
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impossible, to resolve this conundrum under the law as written.
The final complicating factor is the uniqueness of charter
schools compared to traditional schools. Because many charter
schools utilize unique curricula and teaching methods, the duty to
provide a “comparable” off-site setting under Section 504 and the
ADA seems to present a bigger hurdle for charters to overcome when
denying admission in lieu of placement at another school than that
faced by traditional schools. But uniqueness should not be the
guiding principle in determining on-site and off-site placement,
because each school is unique for at least its location and student
body composition. Instead, the focus should remain on whether the
needed services create an undue burden or fundamental alteration, a
burden more likely met by an independent charter with few resources
and a unique curriculum and teaching method.

